Development of the mechanism of grain market regulation as a direction of the state agro-industrial policy of the Russian Federation / Развитие механизма регулирования рынка зерна как направление государственной агропромышленной политики Российской Федерации

2017 was a record year for the grain harvest for the Russian agro-industrial complex. According to preliminary data, it amounted to about 130 million tons. ^[1]. The current situation has led to a significant reduction in prices for these agricultural products in the regions of the Central, Volga, Siberian and Ural Federal districts, which are not attractive to its exporters due to the significant costs of transportation to the main export ports.

Thus, the fall in prices for food wheat class 4 in the above regions was an average of 1,300 rubles per ton (according to the Ministry of agriculture of Russia). To date, the regulation of the grain market in the Russian Federation, including in the case of a significant drop in the purchase prices for it, is carried out through public procurement interventions ^[2].

In accordance with article 14 of the Federal law of 29 December 2006 № 264-FZ "About agriculture development" (hereinafter – the Law No. 264-FZ) in order to regulate the market of agricultural products, raw materials and food, as well as maintaining the level of incomes of agricultural producers provided for conducting the state procurement and commodity interventions in the relevant markets.

The mechanism of state interventions is regulated by the Rules for the acquisition of agricultural products from agricultural producers in the process of state procurement interventions and its implementation, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on October 5, 2017 № 1003 (hereinafter – the Rules 1003).

State procurement and commodity interventions are carried out through trading on exchanges licensed to organize exchange trade and selected on a competitive basis by the Ministry of agriculture of Russia.

Organization of state procurement and commodity interventions carried out by the Ministry of agriculture, who is responsible for their timely implementation ^{[3, p. 7-17]}.

According to the decision of the Government of the Russian Federation, it is possible to sell the stocks of the intervention Fund without trading on the exchanges in the cases established by the Rules 1003.

The reserves of the intervention Fund are the property of JSC "UGC" and are pledged to the JSC "Rosselkhozbank", as the costs for the formation of the intervention Fund are implemented at the expense of credits of banks (currently, only JSC "Russian agricultural Bank").

State procurement and commodity interventions, placement of stocks of the intervention Fund and organization of their quantitative and qualitative safety are carried out by JSC OZK, which is currently a state agent selected on a competitive basis by the Ministry of agriculture of Russia.

At the expense of the Federal budget, the agent's expenses are compensated, which in 2017 according to the Ministry of agriculture of Russia amounted to 9.4 billion rubles, including:

* for storage-3.4 billion rubles;

* for insurance-0.36 billion rubles;

* interest for the loan-5.2 billion rubles;

* remuneration to the agent-0.44 billion rubles.

The commercial organizations involved in the interventions (JSC OZK and JSC "Rosselkhozbank") are forced to accept price risks caused by the state regulation of the market, but not compatible with their statutory goals.

It should be noted that the withdrawal of grain from the collateral, even if there is a decision of the Government of the Russian Federation must be agreed with JSC "agricultural Bank".

Despite the fact that this mechanism requires significant expenditures of the Federal budget, does it effectively contribute to the achievement of the goals set by the Law № 264-FZ?

For a long time, the mechanism of state procurement and commodity interventions has been functioning on the Russian market. In the last century, similar to this mechanism, attempts to regulate the grain market were made by many countries, but over time, the country - the largest grain producers refused this practice. Today, in the Russian Federation, grain production and rolling stock are steadily increasing, and therefore, the need to store in the intervention Fund significant (4 million. tons as of October 1, 2017) stocks of grain is missing, especially as the storage of grain for emergency situations does not apply to the aims of the intervention Fund (this is a function of state reserve) ^{[4, p. 102]}.

The question remains whether the volume of grain purchased to the intervention Fund (about 1.5 million tons per year) can have a significant impact on the price of grain in the conditions of growth of its production and the volume of rolling stocks, as well as how commensurate the effect of state interventions in maintaining the profitability of agricultural producers, and the cost of maintaining the intervention Fund.

Among the significant drawbacks of the current mechanism are unpredictable budget risks due to the fact that the purchase and sale of grain from the intervention Fund is carried out by the decisions of the Ministry of agriculture of Russia in the amount that is also determined by the Ministry of agriculture of Russia. Thus, at the time when the budget allocations for the next fiscal year are being planned, it is very difficult to predict the upcoming grain harvest and, consequently, how much grain will need to be purchased in the intervention Fund.

The main regions, where grain is purchased to the intervention Fund, are the subjects of the Russian Federation, remote from the main export ports and having high costs for the transportation of products and at the same time low yields ^[7]. When the state buys grain in the intervention Fund from agricultural producers of these entities, it thereby stimulates the increase in grain production in the region. Agricultural producers are confident that they will find buyers of their products in the form of the state and do not seek buyers of their products on their own, including seeking access to foreign markets.

In addition, at present, the State program for the development of agriculture and regulation of markets for agricultural products, raw materials and food for 2013-2020 (hereinafter – the state Program) does not have any indicator or indicator that allows to assess the degree of achievement of the goals defined by Law No. 264-FZ. The effectiveness of this measure is not currently being evaluated. The analysis of the passport of the subprogram " Ensuring the General conditions of functioning of the agro-industrial complex "of the state Program showed the presence of only one indicator related to the grain in the said subprogram:"the share of grain of Russian production in the total resources of the domestic market of this product (taking into account the structure of At the same time, there is no correlation of the specified indicator with the goals of stabilizing the price indicator ^[5].

Thus, it seems appropriate to consider alternative models to maintain the level of income of agricultural producers in order to reduce Federal budget expenditures and improve the efficiency of this mechanism, taking into account the current conditions of the agro-industrial complex.

The first model is a compensation to agricultural producers of their lost income. In addition to direct compensation of losses in income due to the decline in market prices, this model also allows to influence the domestic purchase price of grain in the direction of increase. Its essence is as follows:

1. At the beginning of the year, the Ministry of agriculture sets guaranteed grain prices. The minimum guaranteed price provides agricultural producers cover the costs of agricultural production and obtaining a minimum income.

2. Before the start of the new agricultural year, the grain producer submits to the Ministry of agriculture of Russia (or the regional authority of the agro-industrial complex of the subject of the Russian Federation) documents confirming the volume and price of grain sales. If grain is sold at prices below the guaranteed prices, the state compensates the agricultural producer for the lost income .

3. Guaranteed prices are differentiated throughout the year. Minimum prices are set for the harvest period, when market grain prices are minimal. Thus, the state encourages agricultural producers not to sell grain in the specified period within the country, and to store until the price increases or to sell for export.

4. Further (presumably since November), the guaranteed price increases with the growth of the agricultural producer's expenses for grain storage. Thus, the price fluctuation during the year can be up to 10%. Thus, agricultural producers are guaranteed to compensate for their costs of grain storage in a period of low prices.

5. Guaranteed prices can be set by the subjects of the Russian Federation.

This mechanism has a number of significant advantages over the current one. In particular, the lack of commitment from the state for the payment of grain storage and paying interest to the Bank. In the context of the subjects of the Russian Federation, restrictions on the amount of compensation can be established, thus the state can influence the volume of grain production in the regions ^{[9, 10]}. There are incentives for agricultural producers to keep grain until the price rises, rather than to sell it on the market during the period of low prices after harvest.

But the shortcomings of the proposed mechanism should also be considered:

1. Agricultural producers do not have an incentive to sell grain more expensive on their own, as they are guaranteed compensation for lost income by the state.

2. Possible conspiracy producer with his buyers with the aim of lowering selling prices.

3. The lack of accurate calculation of budget allocations (it is not known how many agricultural producers will apply for compensation).

4. The complexity of the mechanism for understanding agricultural producers.

The second model under consideration is the establishment of a trade and credit Corporation (hereinafter - TTK). Its essence lies in the following. At the beginning of the year, the price at which the agricultural producer will be able to put grain for storage in the trade and credit Corporation is determined. The collateral price provides agricultural producers cover the costs of production of agricultural products, as well as the minimum profitability. For a pledge price of agricultural commodity producer may pledge the grain to storage in TKK. Further, within 9 months, the agricultural producer can buy grain at the price of bookmarks, paying TTK the cost of storage and insurance of grain. If the grain is not purchased within 9 months, the ownership of the TCC passes. TCC can sell grain both on the domestic market and for export, as well as independently carry out its processing or enter into long-term contracts with processing enterprises. TCC may be the recipient of benefits and preferences from the state (e.g. reduced tariffs for transportation to ports for export, tax incentives, etc.) in order to increase its interest in the said mechanism. The interest of the TCC as a commercial organization is in obtaining grain at a low price if it is not bought by the agricultural producer, as well as benefits from the state. The agricultural producer at the same time gets the opportunity to guarantee the sale of grain with a minimum profitability. Prices on the market are stabilized within 9 months due to the withdrawal of a part of grain from the market (the effect is achieved similar to interventions). It may be provided for compensation of TCC costs for storage and insurance of grain for 9 months, if it was not purchased, since it can not dispose of it during this time and thus bears the cost of its maintenance ^[6].

Given that the main reason for the fall in prices during the harvest of grain is the impossibility of its implementation from remote regions, a possible effective measure to maintain the profitability of grain producers in these subjects of the Russian Federation may be the compensation of the transport tariff for the transportation of grain for grain producing entities of the Central, Volga, Ural and Siberian Federal districts. This mechanism is considered as one of the additional incentive measures (can be implemented within the framework of the priority project "Export of agricultural products") aimed at partial or full compensation of the transport tariff for the transportation of grain to ports for export. At the same time, the implementation of this measure is associated with a number of risks, in particular, there may be a decrease in the price of grain in export ports due to the growth of supply. In addition, an incentive for the production of grain in the subjects with high logistics costs is created and as a result – the growth of the need for budget allocations for the implementation of this support measure. In order to prevent excessive growth of grain production in the above-mentioned entities, a mechanism for compensation of the transport tariff within the quotas defined for each entity that is the recipient of this support measure may be provided ^{[7, 8]}. In case of a decision on the implementation of this support measure, there will be a need to search for new export markets for Russian agricultural products in connection with the growth of supply.

The proposed models can be considered as alternative to the existing mechanism. Given that it does not meet modern conditions, and its functioning does not allow to assess the effectiveness of the state support measures on the profitability of agricultural producers, the described options for direct compensation of lost income (or part of income) to agricultural producers can be effective. At the same time, the degree of influence of such support will be easy to assess, and the state will not bear the cost of storage and insurance of grain. In addition, an effective institution can be created that regulates grain wounds on a market basis – a commodity-credit Corporation. Implementing the functions of acceptance for storage and purchase of grain, the KKT will receive benefits from the state. At the same time, the removal of surplus grain in the subjects of the Russian Federation that do not export it, by increasing the competitiveness of these products through subsidies of transport tariffs, can also stabilize grain prices in our country.